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Throwing the Baby Out with the Patriarchy
Scott Titshaw†
Throughout the history of Europe and its former new world colonies,
families have been a central unit for defining legal rights and duties, including
those related to citizenship and immigration. Less than a century ago, a woman
and her children automatically gained or lost citizenship in the U.S. and many
other countries upon her marriage to a citizen or noncitizen. The family was treated
as one unit reflecting the legal identity of the father-husband as “head of family.”
Fortunately, the United States and other governments have increasingly
recognized women – and, to a lesser extent, children – as independent persons
with separate identities under the law. Women no longer lose their U.S. citizenship
when they marry foreign men, and children born out of wedlock now may inherit
their parents’ citizenship. However, the move away from a patriarchal legal
definition of family has coincided with decreasing respect for marital and family
unity as a basis for citizenship and immigration rights. While family unification
remains a loadstar for immigration law, it already has been limited in numerous
ways. The President of the United States and many members of Congress currently
propose to limit it further.
State legal definitions of family have become more liberal and egalitarian
over time.1 In general, the formal rules regulating marriage are now gender neutral,
and states now recognize biracial spouses, same-sex spouses, and, increasingly, de
facto family relationships. While moving more slowly than state family law,
federal birthright citizenship law also has liberalized its recognition of family
status. But it has continued to limit family recognition to legal relationships, such
as marriage and presumed parentage, and to biological parent-child relationships.
De facto “parents” or “spouses” are not recognized. At the same time, it has begun
focusing much more on biology, and family unity has been eroded as an inviolable
principle.
Three important forces have contributed to the trend deemphasizing family

† Scott Titshaw is an Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at
Mercer University Law School. He previously practiced immigration law, clerked for a federal
district court judge, served as a legal translator with Germany’s Constitutional Court, and
researched EU immigration as a Fulbright-Schuman fellow at the European University
Institute in Italy and Leiden University in the Netherlands. He has published numerous articles
on family-based immigration and citizenship.
1. The United States is one of very few countries in the world that define family status differently
for state and family law purposes and for federal citizenship and immigration law purposes.
This increases the level of complexity and the number of potential problems families may
encounter.
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unity in the context of immigration and citizenship: (1) popular immigration
restrictionism with significant racist and xenophobic elements; (2) the
administrative desire for clear and simple definitions; and (3) the continuing
popular desire for family unity. These forces help explain the trends introduced
above.
Decreasing racial obstacles to the use of family-based citizenship and
immigration has changed the complexion of families being united, which may
partially explain current proposals to dramatically cut family-based immigration.
In light of the administrative interest in certainty and simplicity, technological
developments such as genetic testing explain the shift from a traditional focus on
legal and presumed paternity to the new focus on biological parentage, particularly
in cases stemming from the use of assisted reproductive technology (ART).
Finally, the history summarized below demonstrates a paradigm shift from a view
of immigrant families as a single unit legally reflecting the husband-father who
heads it, to a view of immigrants as sometimes-related individuals, each of whose
immigration and citizenship status will be assessed independently.
There is a great deal worth discussing about the liberalization of the
definition of family membership and the coinciding de-emphasis on family-based
immigration. But I will focus today on family-based citizenship acquisition,
particularly on jus sanguinis automatic citizenship transmission from U.S. citizen
parents to their children born abroad. (The Fourteenth Amendment clarifies the
citizenship of almost everyone born on U.S. soil, so jus sanguinis citizenship is
limited to children born abroad.) I will illustrate changes in this area, with three
simplified snapshots in time: 1865, 1920, and today.2
SNAPSHOT 1: 1865
In 1865, the U.S. Civil War ended, terminating the legal institution of slavery
and legal prohibitions on marriage for formerly enslaved people. Yet antimiscegenation laws would last another century, and it would be even longer before
same-sex couples could marry. This means that many families were not legally
recognized and, therefore, not covered by immigration and citizenship laws related
to marital and family unity.
Although not available to all families, legal familial status, when recognized,
was generally inviolable as it centered on a man’s marriage and his legal
dependents. Under the “headship” principle, the family unit centered on the
husband-father as the “head of family.” Domestic laws reflected the prevalent
2. Several excellent sources recount the historical developments sketched out below in much
greater detail. Brief for Professors of History, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (No. 15-1191); Kristin A. Collins,
Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race,
and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); Peter Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship,
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 709-16 (2011); American Citizenship: Hearing Before a Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on Immigr., 72d Cong. (1933); E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965 (1981).
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doctrine of “coverture” under which the legal identity and property of the wife
“merged” into the legal identity of her husband. It was said “a woman had no legal
existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and
representative in the social state.”3 The husband-father was also considered the
principle legal guardian of children born into his marriage.
Jus sanguinis citizenship law in the Nineteenth Century also reflected this
principle. The statutory language proscribing citizenship transmission between
1790 and 1855 referred merely to the children “of citizens,” but the “headship”
principle was so pervasive that this neutral language generally was interpreted to
apply only to children born in wedlock to a U.S. citizen father. Congress
eventually codified this interpretation in 1855.4 In the same Act, it also clarified
that a noncitizen woman automatically acquired U.S. citizenship when she married
a U.S. citizen man.5 The husbands of U.S. citizen women, on the other hand, did
not gain citizenship in this manner.
In the era of coverture and the “headship” principle, it is not surprising that
a family’s citizenship status would be one and the same, and that it would be
determined by the citizenship of the husband-father, the only family member
legally recognized as a full citizen for many purposes, such as voting, jury service,
and military service. The family’s citizenship status logically reflected his.
The laws of an era in which children’s status hinged on that of their
“legitimate” father was equally unkind to children born out-of-wedlock. Such a
child was legally considered filius nullius or a “child of no one,” neither their
biological father or mother, under both domestic and citizenship laws.
SNAPSHOT 2: 1920
By 1920, there had been some major changes in both citizenship and
domestic law, but much remained the same. This was the age of a general bar on
Asian immigration, and anti-miscegenation laws were still prevalent. Yet there
had been significant progress for many women. The Nineteenth Amendment was
adopted, providing women the right to vote. “Coverture” had been fading in
importance for a generation, and women were gaining recognition as separate
legal individuals. There had been movement to recognize children born out of
wedlock so they were legally recognized as their mother’s children even in the
citizenship context, where the Department of State had begun recognizing
citizenship transmission from single U.S. citizen mothers to their children born
abroad. Yet, U.S. citizen fathers still could only transmit citizenship to children
born out of wedlock through legitimation, which generally required marriage to
the child’s mother.

3. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 14 (1873) (Brandley, J., concurring) (describing this historic
common law maxim in explaining that a woman was legally incapable of making a binding
legal contract and, thus, “incompetent” to practice law).
4. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1.
5. Id. at § 2.
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Coverture lived on in citizenship law, however, and married women could
not transmit U.S. citizenship to their children as single mothers could. In fact, a
U.S. citizen woman automatically lost her citizenship if she married a foreign man
in 1920.
One woman, who lost her citizenship upon marrying a British citizen in the
U.S., challenged this law, but the Supreme Court rejected her Fourteenth
Amendment argument in MacKenzie v. Hare relying, in part, on the “ancient
principle” of “unity of interests” of husband and wife which “may make it of
public concern in many instances to merge their identity, and give dominance to
the husband.”6 In 1922, Congress would step in to rescind this involuntary
expatriation rule, but only for citizen women marrying foreign nationals, who were
eligible to naturalize and become U.S. citizens. Of course, this excluded Asian
husbands at the time.
SNAPSHOT 3: 2018
Things have changed considerably since 1920 for women and for children
born out of wedlock. Racial inadmissibility and quotas were repealed in 1965.
Coverture is generally a thing of the past in the United States. Following the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, all U.S. states and federal
immigration authorities recognize marriage equality for same-sex couples.7 In
Sessions v. Morales-Sanatana, the Court struck down a shorter physical presence
requirement for women than for men transmitting citizenship to children born outof-wedlock abroad.8 Citizenship laws discriminating on the basis of sex seem to
be slowly disappearing.9
ADMINISTRATIVE DECONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL FAMILIES: BIOLOGY AND
GENETIC TESTING
The decline in citizenship laws that discriminate based on sex is a positive
change, but new issues of inequality have arisen. Modern technology and the
certainty of genetic testing is probably one reason courts and government officials
are more willing to treat fathers and mothers similarly regarding their children
born out-of-wedlock. Yet that same technology now undermines marital
presumptions regarding parentage of children born in-wedlock. Bureaucrats prefer
this sort of certainty, and the U.S. State Department adopted a genetic essentialist
approach to parentage for citizenship purposes in recent decades. This initially
meant a U.S. citizen woman would not transmit her citizenship if she gave birth
6.
7.
8.
9.

MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015).
Sessions v. Morales-Sanatana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
Of course, some gender-based distinctions have been upheld by the Supreme Court. See
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding paternal acknowledgment requirement on
fathers, but not mothers, in order to ensure the existence of a biological parent-child
relationship in the case of citizenship transmission).
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to a child conceived through assisted reproductive technology (ART) using
another woman’s genetic material.10 Although the State Department modified this
rule in 2014, it still requires a “biological” (gestational or genetic) relationship
between a U.S. citizen and her child in order to recognize citizenship transmission
upon birth abroad. Any child born to a surrogate is still a non-citizen at birth unless
the child is genetically related to a U.S. citizen. This demonstrates a substantial
shift from the focus on legal and marital family unity to a focus on biological
parent-child relationships.
In addition to the willingness to ignore “marriage” and legal parentage at
birth of children conceived through ART, the Supreme Court’s remedy in
Morales-Santana actually increased the physical presence requirement for single
mothers to transmit citizenship to children born abroad from one year to five years.
In each case, fewer children will inherit citizenship from their legal parents.
POLITICAL DECONSTRUCTION OF FAMILIES
Immigration restrictionists have been around as long as there has been
immigration. However, they seem to be on the ascent since the election of
President Trump. They have proposed laws that would keep U.S. citizen parents
and their children apart or force them to live in de facto exile abroad in order to
remain together as a family. For example, President Trump officially supports the
RAISE Act of Senators Cotton and Perdue, which would separate families by
eliminating permanent resident eligibility for parents of adult U.S. citizen children,
by lowering the maximum age to apply for permanent residence for children of
lawful permanent residents and citizens from twenty-one to eighteen, by
implementing a quota on the number of new permanent resident spouses and
minor children, and by eliminating other family-based immigration categories
(e.g., brothers and sisters).11
CONCLUSION
There have been two prominent bases for defining family for citizenship and
immigration purposes: legal relationships such as marriage and parentage (or
principle legal guardianship in the case of married men and their children); and
biological (so called “natural”) parent-child relationships. Over time, legal
definitions of family have become more liberal and more egalitarian. While
lagging behind changes in family law, U.S. citizenship law has adjusted to these
expanded definitions, but it also has begun focusing much more on biology at the
expense of marital presumptions and other bases for recognizing parental
relationships. At the same time, family unity has been eroded as an inviolable
10. See Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal: to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, & etc.:
Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 482-83 (2011).
11. S. 354, 115th Cong. (2017); President Donald J. Trump Backs RAISE Act, Aug. 2, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-backs-raise-act/.
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principle of U.S. immigration and citizenship law by laws like those insisting on
biological parent-child links or longer physical presence requirements as
prerequisites for citizenship transmission.
As Professor Kristin Collins has persuasively argued, family and citizenship
law rules have interacted throughout most of American history to limit recognition
of nonwhite children of U.S. citizens.12 These, often indirect, racial obstacles to
the use of family-based citizenship and immigration have largely vanished,
changing the complexion of families now being united. The subset of
restrictionists motivated by racism and xenophobia are likely more willing to limit
family unity now that the families being united are less likely to be white. This
may partially explain current proposals to dramatically cut family-based
immigration.
The desire for easy and certain answers in the name of administrative
efficiency also helps explain the trends noted above. Until recently, the best way
to prove paternity of a child born out of wedlock was through witness testimony
with some limited support from blood-type tests. Now modern DNA tests can
provide bright-line answers to many questions of biological parentage, and some
lawmakers and bureaucrats may be willing to separate legally recognized,
cohabiting families in order to avoid complex analysis, ambiguity and the dangers
of fraud and arbitrary decisions. This is exemplified by recent efforts to define
parent-child relationships stemming from assisted reproductive technology (ART)
by focusing solely on genetic and biological links at the expense of legal family
relationships.
Unlike most other countries, the United States determines family status
independently at the federal level for purposes like citizenship and immigration
and at the state level for most other purposes. State laws are moving from
relatively uniform formal legal indicators of family formation such as marriage
and presumed parentage, which also are fairly easily to demonstrate, to concepts
like de facto parentage or intended parentage in the context of ART, which require
more judgment and broader evidence to determine and which are regulated
differently from state to state. An emphasis on federal uniformity and
administrative simplicity may be particularly compelling to lawmakers and
administrators in this context.
Finally, the history summarized above demonstrates a paradigm shift from a
single-family unit, legally reflecting the husband-father who heads it, to a group
of related individuals, each of whose immigration and citizenship status will be
assessed in a largely independent manner. Separating a family unit at the border
might have once seemed like allowing a person’s head and feet to immigrate while
barring her torso and arms at the border.13 But now, the family curtain has been
12. Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction
of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014).
13. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 9-10 (1985) (describing how the nineteenth century family
household presented a “façade of organic unity” that masked specialized individual roles
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pulled back, and the focus is on individual immigrants and prospective citizens,
each of whom authorities are willing to include or exclude for any number of
reasons. Proposed point systems like that proposed in the RAISE Act are
examples of an increasing willingness to favor economic interests in possible
employees and entrepreneurs with advanced skills, education, and financial
resources over the interests of aspiring immigrants and their U.S. citizen relatives
in family unity.
I would not like to see us close the curtain again and ignore individual
distinctions among immigrants in favor of an overriding focus on the family unit.
But I do believe we should reemphasize the importance of family relationships
and unity to individual immigrants and prospective citizens.

within the group); RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT S TANDS: THE UNITED
STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE, 1865-1896 136-37 (2017) (“The
production of homes was the ultimate rationale for the economy, for the nation itself, and for
the public policies and activist government embraced by Republicans” in the period following
the Civil War.) This focus on a unified family-unit was reflected in “coverture” laws and in
laws described above, which automatically granted and removed citizenship of wives and
children to reflect the citizenship of the adult male “head of family.”
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